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Abstract: The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at 
least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the con-
stituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be re-
garded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object 
and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be re-
garded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and 
constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spa-
tially coincident and the property differences between then are simply 
differences in description, perspective or context. In contrast, plural-
ists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not iden-
tical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they 
are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle 
of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows 
that it can better account for the property differences between the 
constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them 
as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material con-
stitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puz-
zle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, 
based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can 
yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. 
The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the 
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referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term deter-
mine which referent properties are picked out. 
Keywords: Constitution; Fregean; identity; monism; pluralism; refer-
ence; sense. 
1. Introduction 
 Material constitution is a one-one or whole-whole relation. It concerns 
the relation of one object (for example, a piece of bronze) constituting an-
other object (for example, a bronze statue) where both the constituting and 
the constituted objects are materially and spatially coincident. The puzzle 
of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how 
can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially 
and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can 
the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively 
different, be regarded as identical objects? In contrast, material composition 
is a many-one or part-whole relation. It concerns the relationship of two or 
more objects (for example, two or more pieces of bronze) constituting a fur-
ther object (a bronze statue) where both the constituting object and the con-
stituted object share at least some of the same material parts. As this paper 
is about the puzzle of material constitution, and not material composition, 
I shall not discuss problems arising from material composition further. 
 Solutions to the puzzle of material constitution can be divided into two 
broad camps. The first camp claims that material constitution is simply 
identity (for example, the piece of bronze constituting the bronze statue is 
identical to the bronze statue). As the piece of bronze and the bronze statue 
are materially and spatially coincident, they are identical. In contrast, the 
second camp claims that material constitution is not identity despite their 
material and spatial coincidence (for example, the piece of bronze consti-
tuting the statue is not identical to the bronze statue) because they do not 
share all of the same properties (for example, the bronze statue, but not the 
piece of bronze, possesses aesthetic appeal). Following Kit Fine (2003), 
I shall label the first camp monism and the second camp pluralism. In  
holding that the constituting and constituted objects are identical, pluralist 
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critics claim that monism cannot account for how they have different prop-
erties. And in holding that the constituting and constituted objects are dis-
tinct, monist critics claim that pluralism cannot account for why there can 
be two or more materially and spatially coincident objects. 
 My sympathy lies with the monist camp. However, I agree with the 
pluralist critics that if the constituting and constituted objects are identical, 
their qualitative differences have to be explained, and not explained away 
as mere differences in description, perspective, or context. And I propose 
a version of monism called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), to better account for 
the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects 
without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, 
the puzzle of material constitution as partly a semantic puzzle and partly 
a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of 
the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, 
can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The 
key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the referent 
object and its referent properties and thereby addresses the metaphysical 
part of the puzzle, the sense of the term determines which referent proper-
ties of the referent object are picked out and thereby addresses the semantic 
part of the puzzle. 
 In what follows, I shall outline the puzzle of material constitution, ex-
plicate the Fregean-Monist solution to the puzzle, show how this solution 
can address pluralist criticisms against monism, and critically evaluate the 
master argument employed by pluralists—the argument from Leibniz’s 
Law, before concluding that the property differences between the constitut-
ing and constituted objects can be accounted for without the need to regard 
them as two distinct objects. 
2. The puzzle of material constitution 
 The puzzle of material constitution can be illustrated through the example 
of the piece of bronze and the bronze statue. Suppose that, on Monday, 
a sculptor purchases an unformed piece of bronze, which he names ‘Lump’. 
Suppose further that, on Tuesday, he sculpts the bronze into the form of king 
David and names it ‘David.’ Monists claim that the sculptor possesses only 
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one object, for David is identical to Lump because they are materially and 
spatially coincident. Yet, pluralists claim that Lump and David differ in var-
ious respects. First, Lump and David differ in their temporal properties: 
Lump existed on Monday, David did not. Second, Lump could survive being 
squashed, David could not. Third, they differ in kind: Lump is a piece of 
bronze, David is a bronze statue. They claim that if Lump and David differ 
in even one way, they are not identical, for Leibniz’s Law tells that for any 
x and y, if x and y are distinct then there is at least one property that x has 
and y does not, or conversely, for any x and y, if x and y are identical, then 
x and y share all of the same properties. Thus, they conclude that the sculptor 
possesses two objects: a bronze statue and a piece of bronze. More generally, 
pluralists claim that there must be two material objects existing in the same 
place at the same time because they do not share all of the same properties. 
Moreover, pluralists claim that two material objects can exist in the same 
place at the same time because they are objects of a different kind. 
 On the contrary, monists claim that spatially coincident objects are im-
possible. Wiggins (1968) calls the monist claim—that two things cannot 
completely occupy exactly the same place or exactly the same volume for 
exactly the same period of time—a truism. L.A. Paul (2010) neatly sum-
marises the monist arguments for constitution as identity. First, monists 
can claim that any differences in essence or other properties between David 
and Lump are only apparent; they are just differences in description based 
on different contexts. For example, we call the object ‘David’ when we as-
cribe an essence including being statue-shaped and having aesthetic appeal 
and we call it ‘Lump’ when we ascribe a different essence and properties 
such as its chemical structure and what it is suited to build. In other words, 
the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects 
are only skin-deep; they are context-dependent rather than observer-inde-
pendent features of the world. Second, monists can claim that their view is 
simpler and that the pluralist view fills reality with layer upon layer of 
excess ontological fat (Bennett 2004). We can adopt a leaner and meaner 
view by identifying the constituting and constituted objects, just as a pic-
ture is just an arrangement of pixels on paper (Lewis 1994). More generally, 
we can view the apparent incompatibilities of properties as simply the con-
sequence of incompatibilities in perspective or description. 
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3. Towards a Fregean-Monist solution to the puzzle  
of material constitution 
 Perhaps a useful first step to navigate a way through the tortuous puzzle 
of material constitution is to spell out the agreements between the monists 
and the pluralists. First, both sides agree that the constituting and consti-
tuted objects are materially and spatially coincident but disagree on 
whether they are identical. Second, both sides agree that the puzzle of ma-
terial constitution has a semantic aspect. While most monists claim that 
any differences in essence or other properties between the constituting and 
constituted objects are only apparent, or are differences in description based 
on different contexts, most pluralists claim that the choice to include objects 
into or exclude objects from our ontological scheme is based on whether 
certain sortal terms exist in ordinary language. Perhaps an adequate solu-
tion to the puzzle of material constitution is in part semantic and in part 
metaphysical.  
 The next step is to highlight the most plausible elements of both monist 
and pluralist positions. Even if we reject the monists’ claim that the prop-
erty differences between the constituting and constituted objects are only 
skin-deep or context-dependent, we need not reject their aim to trim excess 
ontological fat off the pluralists’ account. That is, the monist account has 
the principle of parsimony on its side as it has the simpler explanation of 
material constitution involving the fewest entities, provided that its explan-
atory power is not inferior to that of the pluralist account. And even if we 
reject the pluralists’ claim that there are two or more objects occupying the 
same place at the same time for the sake of parsimony, we need not reject 
their aim to account for property differences. That is, the pluralist account 
has the virtue of saving appearances on its side as it aims to explain the 
way things seem like to us, what Lynn Rudder Baker calls ‘a metaphysics 
of ordinary things’ (Baker 2008). 
 Keeping the first two steps in mind, the third step is to define the con-
cepts of object and property since they are key to resolving this puzzle. 
A definition offered by C.B. Martin and John Heil, which I endorse, is as 
follows: ‘Objects can have parts, but an object’s properties are not its parts, 
they are the particular ways the object is’ (Martin and Heil 1999, 45). When 
Fregean Monism: A Solution to the Puzzle of Material Constitution 509 
Organon F 27 (4) 2020: 504–521 
material parts are arranged, organised, or structured in certain ways (in the 
static sense), or when material parts connect, interact or enter into pro-
cesses with one another in certain ways (in the dynamic sense), then the 
object constituted by these material parts bear certain properties. Objects 
can be treated as concrete particulars while properties can be treated as 
abstract particulars, distinct from and yet grounded on objects or concrete 
particulars. Different terms can be used to represent a single object or con-
crete particular in different ways, including or excluding certain properties 
or abstract particulars. For example, the term ‘Lump’ can be used to rep-
resent a bronze object, or a chunk of bronze parts arranged in a certain way 
occupying a certain place at a certain time, including some of its the prop-
erties (weight and size) but excluding others (statue-shape and aesthetic 
appeal). And the term ‘David’ can be used to represent the same bronze 
object, or the same chunk of bronze parts arranged in the same way, in-
cluding more of its properties than ‘Lump’ (weight, size, statue-shape, and 
aesthetic appeal). 
 I shall call this view Fregean Monism (FM) since it is largely based on 
Frege’s famous distinction between reference (extension) and sense (inten-
sion) with a few modifications. FM is based on the following claims: 
i. Terms refer to objects and their properties. 
ii. Terms have reference (extension) and sense (intension). The reference 
(extension) of a term picks out an object and its properties; the sense 
(intension) of the term determine which properties of the object are 
picked out. 
iii. Referent objects are objects picked out by their corresponding terms; 
referent properties are properties picked out by their corresponding 
terms. 
iv. Referent objects are concrete particulars (arrangements of material 
parts); referent properties are abstract particulars (ways arrangements 
of material parts are). 
v. Two or more terms can have the same reference or referent object. 
vi. Even when two or more terms have the same reference (pick out the 
same referent object), they can have different senses (pick out different 
referent properties of that referent object). For example, ‘David’ picks 
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out properties including weight, size, statue-shape and aesthetic appeal 
whereas ‘Lump’ picks out properties such as weight and size but not 
statue-shape and aesthetic appeal, even when both terms refer to the 
same object—the bronze piece.  
 On this view, semantic pluralism (the linguistic component of the view) 
explains property pluralism (the metaphysical component of the view). 
While ‘David’ and ‘Lump’ refer to the same object or concrete particular, 
the properties or abstract particulars picked out by ‘David’ and ‘Lump’ are 
different because of their different senses. While the senses of both ‘David’ 
and ‘Lump’ pick out the weight and size of the object, the sense of ‘David’ 
but not ‘Lump’ picks out its statue-shape and aesthetic appeal. Unlike other 
versions of monism, FM explains the monists’ intuition that materially and 
spatially coincident objects are identical without explaining away property 
differences as mere differences in description, perspective, or context. And 
unlike pluralism, FM explains the pluralists’ intuition about property plu-
ralism without appealing to object pluralism. 
 To explain property pluralism, FM posits two kinds of reference—refer-
ent objects and referent properties. While reference (extension) picks out 
both the referent object and its referent properties and accounts for the 
metaphysics, sense (intension) determines which referent properties of the 
referent object are picked out and accounts for the semantics. This concep-
tual distinction provides a solution to the puzzle of material constitution, 
which could have arisen because terms do not pick out all of the referent 
properties of a referent object. And as terms do not pick out all of the 
referent properties of a referent object, different terms represent the referent 
object in a different and partial way by picking out some of its referent 
properties but not others. As such, FM is not only a semantic solution, but 
also a metaphysical one. It does not explain away differences in properties 
as mere differences in description, perspective, or context. Instead, it ex-
plains why a referent object can seem to have different referent properties 
by showing how different terms pick out some but not all of the referent 
properties possessed by the referent object. 
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4. Pluralist arguments against monism  
and Fregean-Monist responses  
 The first argument pluralists employ against monists is the argument 
from Leibniz’s Law (Fine 2003; Frances 2006). According to this argument, 
David and Lump cannot be one and the same object because there is at 
least one difference between them, and by holding that David and Lump 
are one and the same object despite their property differences, monism vi-
olates Leibniz’s Law. Yet, Leibniz’s Law is not violated when the property 
differences are accounted for by different terms picking out the different 
properties of one and the same object, as terms referring to one and the 
same object pick out some but not all of its properties. An object is called 
‘David’ when its aesthetic appeal is picked out and called ‘Lump’ when its 
aesthetic appeal is not picked out. Like other monists, proponents of FM 
assume that there is only a single object, a piece of bronze, occupying 
a place at a time, being referred to as ‘David’ or ‘Lump.’ But unlike other 
monists, proponents of FM tell a deeper story by emphasising that ‘David’ 
and ‘Lump’ have the same referent object but different referent properties. 
And the senses of ‘David’ and ‘Lump’ determine which referent properties 
are picked out. FM shows how the semantic difference explains the onto-
logical difference. On this view, the aesthetic appeal of the piece of bronze 
is not merely a way of describing the piece of bronze within a certain context 
(a predicate); it also picks out the way the piece of bronze is under certain 
circumstances (a property). In other words, aesthetic appeal is possessed by 
the piece of bronze but it is picked out by the sense of ‘David’ but not the 
sense of ‘Lump.’ Thus, FM does not violate Leibniz’s Law by explaining 
property differences in terms of different terms picking out the different 
properties of one and the same object, as terms referring to one and the 
same object pick out some but not all of its properties. 
 The second related argument pluralists employ against the monists is 
the argument from different persistent conditions between the constituting 
and constituted objects (Baker 1997, 2000). On the pluralist view, David 
ceases to exist as the constituted object should it lose its essential/funda-
mental property—aesthetic appeal—by losing its statue-shape while Lump 
persists as the constituting object. Yet, everything else about David remains 
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intact other than its aesthetic appeal. Why, then, hold that David as an 
object or concrete particular, ceases to exist? On other versions of monism, 
‘David’ is just a different description of ‘Lump’ from another perspective or 
in another context. In other words, the difference between the constituting 
and constituted objects is merely semantic. However, there is also an onto-
logical difference between them, for what cease to exist are properties or 
abstract particulars (aesthetic appeal), even if the object or concrete par-
ticular (bronze object) persists. On the FM view, different terms designating 
the same referent object pick out different referent properties. When a cer-
tain referent property (aesthetic appeal) of a referent object (bronze object) 
no longer exists, the term (‘David’) that picks out the lost referent property 
(aesthetic appeal) no longer applies. To borrow Aristotle’s examples, an eye 
remains numerically the same eye after losing its sight and an axe remains 
numerically the same axe after losing its sharpness. At most, it can be ar-
gued that the term ‘axe’ that picks out the lost referent property, sharpness, 
is no longer applicable to the now blunt axe-shaped object, or that the term 
‘eye’ that picks out the lost referent property, sight, is no longer applicable 
to the now blind eye-shaped object. And perhaps other terms can be used 
to pick out the blunt axe-shaped object or the blind eye-shaped object. But 
it is another thing to argue that an axe, as an object, ceases to exist when 
it becomes blunt or an eye, as an object, ceases to exist when it becomes 
blind, when the material parts arranged axe-wise or eye-wise respectively, 
still occupy the same place at the same time. Hence, the appearance of two 
materially and spatially coincident objects with different persistence condi-
tions can be explained as two different terms picking out the same referent 
object but different referent properties. 
 The two above pluralist arguments can be re-expressed as a reductio 
argument against monism. According to this argument, holding that the 
constituting and constituted objects are a single object implies that it both 
possesses and lacks a property such as aesthetic appeal, or that it both 
exists and not exists at the same time, and hence results in a contradiction. 
This argument works only on the assumption that property pluralism im-
plies object pluralism, an assumption challenged by the proponents of FM. 
On the FM view, the constituting object (Lump) and the constituted object 
(David) are not two different referent objects but two different terms 
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(‘Lump’ and ‘David’) picking out different referent properties of the same 
referent object (bronze object). The bronze object is called ‘David’ when 
aesthetic appeal is present and is called ‘Lump’ when aesthetic appeal is 
absent. And the bronze object can gain aesthetic appeal and be called ‘Da-
vid’ or lose aesthetic appeal and be called ‘Lump.’ It is not the case that 
a new object (David) comes into existence and coincides with an existing 
object (Lump) after gaining a new property (aesthetic appeal) and goes out 
of existence and no longer coincides with the existing object (Lump) after 
losing the new property (aesthetic appeal). In other words, it is not the case 
that some properties possessed by Lump are not possessed by David and 
vice versa. On the contrary, it is the case that David and Lump are a single 
object referred to by two different terms with the same extension but dif-
ferent intensions that pick out some but not all the referent properties. 
Hence, there is no contradiction in holding that the constituting and con-
stituted objects are a single object and the reductio argument does not 
succeed. 
 The third argument pluralists employ against the monists is the argu-
ment from primary kinds. Originating from Aristotle, an object’s primary 
kind defines what it is essentially or fundamentally (Baker 2002, 2008). For 
example, a statue (David) is a different kind of object from a piece of bronze 
(Lump) as the former is essentially an art object whereas the latter is es-
sentially a piece of raw material. So, how many objects there are in the 
same place at the same time depends on how many kinds of objects there 
are. Monists object that the notion of primary kinds is not without prob-
lems. First, postulating how many kinds of materially and spatially coin-
ciding objects there are remains arbitrary as it is contingent upon our epis-
temic interests and linguistic conventions. Second, the correspondence be-
tween the sortal terms in our language and the kinds of objects in the world 
requires further explanation and the decision to include some kinds and 
exclude others requires further justification (Wilson 2007). For these rea-
sons, FM treats primary kinds as conceptual categories rather than onto-
logical categories, like other forms of monism. Unlike other forms of mon-
ism, however, FM shows how the semantic pluralism of primary kind terms 
account for their property pluralism without resorting to object pluralism. 
On the FM view, different primary kind terms are employed to look at 
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a single object in different ways, including or excluding certain properties, 
rather than to pick out distinct materially and spatially coincident objects 
because of differing properties. That is, different primary kind terms, with 
different senses, pick out different properties of a single object instead of 
different objects. Categorising a piece of bronze as a statue kind (David) is 
seeing it inclusive of its aesthetic appeal and categorising the same piece of 
bronze as a raw material kind (Lump) is seeing it exclusive of its aesthetic 
appeal. Thus, primary kinds need not be ontological categories that pick 
out different objects because they do not share all of the same properties; 
they can be conceptual categories that pick out different properties of a sin-
gle object. 
 On the FM view, objects are concrete particulars, consisting of only their 
material parts and arrangement, implying that only one object can occupy 
one place at a time. This definition rules out the pluralist claim that more 
than one object of different primary kinds can be in the same place at the 
same time, with one object belonging to a primary kind constituting a sec-
ond object belonging to another primary kind, as materially and spatially 
coinciding objects of different kinds cannot count as more than one concrete 
particular. To claim that materially and spatially coincident objects are 
distinct objects, pluralists need to deny that all materially and spatially 
coincident objects are concrete particulars. There are at least two ways 
pluralists can do so. The first way is to claim that some of these objects are 
abstract and that concrete and abstract objects can be materially and spa-
tially coincident. Yet, the distinction between abstract and concrete objects 
is usually taken to mean the type-token or universal-particular distinction, 
and pluralists would not want to claim that a piece of bronze is a token-
particular of a statue type-universal. The second way is to claim that some 
objects are immaterial and that material and immaterial objects can be 
materially and spatially coincident. Yet, pluralists would not want to claim 
that statues are immaterial either. So, if objects are concrete particulars that 
consist only of their material parts and arrangements, then not more than 
one object can occupy a place at a time. And if not more than one object can 
occupy a place at a time, then it is more plausible to treat property differ-
ences between constituting and constituted objects as different properties 
of a single object picked out by different terms with different senses. 
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5. A closer look at the argument from Leibniz’s Law 
 In the earlier section, I have argued that FM does not violate Leibniz’s 
Law. In this section, I want to show that Leibniz’s Law does not necessarily 
support object pluralism. Let us look at a version of Leibniz’s Law (adapted 
from King 2006 and Smid 2017) more thoroughly: 
Premise (1) F(t) (Property Pluralism) 
 Premise (2) ¬F(s)  
Conclusion (1) ⸫ t ≠ s (Semantic Pluralism) 
 Premise (3) t → y & s → x  
Conclusion (2) ⸫ y ≠ x (Object Pluralism) 
where ‘F’ is a predicate expressing a property, ‘s’ and ‘t’ are terms (names 
and definite descriptions) expressing objects, ‘x’ and ‘y’ denote objects, and 
‘→’ denotes ‘picks out/refers to.’ 
 Applying this to the case of David and Lump, where F = aesthetic 
appeal, t = ‘David’ and s = ‘Lump,’ y = David the bronze statue, x = 
Lump the piece of bronze, we have: 
 Premise (1a) ‘David’ possesses the intension/sense of aesthetic 
appeal. 
 Premise (2a) ‘Lump’ lacks the intension/sense of aesthetic ap-
peal. 
 Conclusion (1a) Therefore, ‘David’ is not identical to ‘Lump’. 
 Premise (3a) ‘David’ has David (the bronze statue) as its exten-
sion/referent and ‘Lump’ has Lump (the piece of 
bronze) as its extension/referent. 
 Conclusion (2a) Therefore, David (the bronze statue) is not identi-
cal to Lump (the piece of bronze). 
 Proponents of FM affirm premises (1) and (2) and conclusion (1). They 
affirm that term t has the intension/sense of property F whereas term s does 
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not, and hence terms t and s are not semantically identical terms. At this 
stage, whether t and s refer to one or two objects remains undetermined. In 
other words, only semantic pluralism, but not object pluralism, is ascer-
tained. Proponents of FM also deny premise (3) and conclusion (2). They 
deny object pluralism, held by the pluralists, that the terms t and s pick 
out distinct objects y and x respectively. Does the denial of object pluralism 
violate Leibniz’s Law? I contend that it does not, because Leibniz’s Law 
says nothing about whether premise (3), the claim that the terms t and 
s pick out distinct objects y and x respectively, holds. And I further contend 
that since Leibniz’s Law remains silent on whether premise (3) is true, plu-
ralists cannot rely on premise (3) to derive conclusion (2). Therefore, Leib-
niz’s Law does not necessarily support object pluralism. 
 Since pluralists cannot appeal to Leibniz’s Law to justify premise (3) 
without begging the question, other independent arguments are required. 
That is, pluralists have to show that objects y and x are the referents picked 
out by the terms t and s respectively before they can conclude that y is not 
identical to x. Otherwise, premise (3) remains a contested assumption or 
mere stipulation. Perhaps the strongest pluralist argument for premise (3) 
is the argument from primary kinds, the idea that while objects of the same 
kind cannot occupy the same place at the same time, objects of different 
kinds can. Yet, as mentioned above, the argument from primary kinds re-
mains problematic. First, postulating how many kinds of materially and 
spatially coinciding objects there are still seems arbitrary as it is contingent 
upon our epistemic interests and linguistic conventions, Second, the corre-
spondence between the sortal terms in our language and the kinds of objects 
in the world requires further explanation and the decision to include some 
kinds and exclude others requires further justification. Hence, since the plu-
ralists’ appeal to the argument from primary kinds to support premise (3) 
remains contested, and premise (3) is required for conclusion (2), then the 
pluralists’ appeal to Leibniz’s Law to support conclusion (2) remains con-
tested. 
 On the contrary, FM offers a plausible argument for denying the con-
tested premise (3) and conclusion (2). First, objects, such as x and y, are 
concrete particulars and since concrete particulars are defined only by their 
material parts, arrangement, and location and x and y share exactly the 
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same material parts, arrangement, and location, then x and y are numeri-
cally identical; they are a single object. Despite affirming the material and 
spatial coincidence of x and y, pluralists insist that they are two objects 
instead of one because of the property differences between them. In con-
trast, FM explains the property differences x and y without resorting to an 
object difference. Second, terms s and t need not pick out two distinct ref-
erent objects y and x. Instead, they may pick out the same referent object, 
say z, but pick out different referent properties of z. For example, t may 
pick out referent property F but s may not, even when s and t pick out the 
same referent object z. That is, t and s have the same extension/referent 
but different intension/sense: the term F(t) represents object z with prop-
erty F and the term ¬F(s) represents object z without property F. While 
the pluralist view holds that object pluralism is required to account for 
property pluralism, FM claims that semantic pluralism can account for 
property pluralism—an ontological difference—without object pluralism. 
Third, FM is not claiming that z both possesses and lacks F, but that z can 
be represented in two ways, with or without F, by using the terms t and 
s respectively. It treats primary kinds as conceptual instead of ontological 
categories. Classified under one kind, z can be represented as F(t) and clas-
sified under another kind, z can be represented as ¬F(s). On the FM view, 
only one concrete particular, or a particular arrangement of material parts, 
occupies a place at a time, represented in different ways using different 
terms, or classified under different kinds, including or excluding certain ab-
stract particulars. 
 Applying this analysis to the David and Lump case, ‘David’ and ‘Lump’ 
are two names for a single object—a particular arrangement of bronze parts. 
The term ‘David’ is used to denote it when it is represented as an art object 
(falls under the statue kind/category), with its aesthetic appeal; the term 
‘Lump’ is used to denote it when it is represented as a piece of raw material 
(falls under the raw material kind/category), without its aesthetic appeal. 
When this particular arrangement of bronze parts retains its aesthetic ap-
peal, it can be denoted by both ‘David’ and ‘Lump’ as it falls under both 
the statue and raw material kinds/categories. But when it loses its aesthetic 
appeal for some reason, then it can only be denoted by ‘Lump’ but not 
‘David’ as it no longer falls under the statue kind/category even if it still 
518  Soo Lam Wong 
Organon F 27 (4) 2020: 504–521 
falls under the raw material kind/category. There is only one object all 
along, denoted by different terms picking out different properties. So, on 
the FM view, David and Lump are numerically identical; they are a single 
bronze object capable of bearing all the properties ascribed to both David 
and Lump by the pluralists at certain times but not others, and is called 
‘David’ or ‘Lump’ accordingly, depending on whether it possesses/gains or 
lacks/loses aesthetic appeal. 
 Pluralists may object that FM, like other versions of monism, changes 
the puzzle of material constitution from an ontological problem to a mere 
semantic problem, or reducing ‘a metaphysics of everyday things’ to merely 
‘a description of everyday things.’ In the above analysis of Leibniz’s Law, 
for example, proponents of FM seem to change the discussion from one 
about objects (x and y) and properties (F) to one about subjects and pred-
icates (F(t)) and (¬F(s)). This is not the case, however. Proponents of FM 
apply a semantic tool, the distinction between the sense and reference of 
terms, to clarify, not dismiss, the ontological part of the puzzle. While the 
reference of a term (t or s) picks out an object (z) and its properties (F), 
the sense of a term determines which of the object’s (z’s) properties are 
picked out and which are not. Both terms, t and s, pick out object z, but 
whereas F(t) pick out property F, ¬F(s) does not. Again, assuming that 
terms ‘David’ and ‘Lump’ refer to a single bronze object, ‘David’ represents 
the bronze object (inclusive of its aesthetic appeal) as an art object whereas 
‘Lump’ represents the same bronze object (exclusive of its aesthetic appeal) 
as a piece of raw material. Proponents of FM treat referent properties or 
abstract particulars as ways referent objects or concrete particulars are, and 
not merely ways referent objects or concrete particulars are described or 
represented. In other words, claims about referent properties are claims 
about ways referent objects are. They are ontological claims, not merely 
semantic ones. As proponents of FM employ semantic tools to clarify rather 
than dismiss ontological claims, the objection that FM changes the puzzle 
of material constitution from an ontological problem to a mere semantic 
problem is unwarranted. 
 Moreover, pluralists may object that proponents of FM have not clearly 
shown that the terms t and s refer to a single object, z and not two objects, 
x and y. Yet, the various arguments presented above, in tandem, offer good 
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reasons in favour of the claim that t and s refer to a single object. First, the 
claim that—if x and y are materially and spatially coincident then they are 
identical objects—remains a truism despite being challenged. As argued 
above, the challenges presented by both the argument from Leibniz’s Law 
and the argument from different primary kinds remain inconclusive. Second, 
the claim that—if x and y do not share property F, then they cannot be 
identical objects—remains questionable. As argued above, whether object 
z possesses/gains or lacks/loses property F does not imply that it must 
therefore be two distinct objects x and y, it may just be two different ways 
of presenting object z, with or without property F, using terms t and s re-
spectively. Third, the monist claim that t and s refer to a single object has 
the principle of parsimony on its side so long as it explains appearances as 
well as the pluralist claim that t and s refer to two distinct objects. As 
argued above, FM does not explain away the qualitative difference between 
x and y as simply differences in description, perspective, or context. Rather, 
it tells a deeper story about how the qualitative difference is dependent on 
whether referent property F is picked out by terms t or s. Therefore, the 
reasons in favour of the monist claim seem stronger than those in favour of 
the pluralist one.  
6. Conclusion 
 The puzzle of material constitution is in part ontological and in part 
semantic and an ideal solution to the puzzle of material constitution should 
address both ontological and semantic issues and possess the twin virtues 
of parsimony and saving appearances. FM is one such attempt. First, by 
holding that objects are concrete particulars or arrangements of material 
parts and that only one concrete particular or arrangement of material parts 
can occupy a place at a time, FM preserves the virtue of parsimony, unlike 
pluralism. Second, by distinguishing between properties as ways objects are 
(ontological category) and terms as ways objects are described or repre-
sented (semantic category), FM does not explain away property differences 
as mere differences in description, perspectives, and context, but explain 
the property differences by applying a semantic tool, the distinction be-
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tween the sense and reference of terms, to clarify, not dismiss, the ontolog-
ical part of the puzzle, unlike other versions of monism. Third, by main-
taining that the reference (extension) of a term picks out an object and its 
properties, and that the sense (intension) of the term determines which 
properties of the object are picked out, FM explains why a referent object 
can seem to have different referent properties by showing how different 
terms pick out some but not all of the referent properties possessed by the 
referent object, thus preserving the virtue of saving appearances, unlike 
other versions of monism. Fourth, in accepting property pluralism and re-
jecting object pluralism, FM does not violate Leibniz’s Law. And as Leib-
niz’s Law remains silent on whether two semantically distinct terms pick 
out two objects or a single object (partially) represented in different ways, 
it does not necessarily support object pluralism. Fifth, to support a meta-
physics of ordinary things, it seems sufficient to have different terms picking 
out different referent properties of a single referent object occupying a place 
at a time rather than to have more than one materially and spatially coin-
ciding referent objects. These points make FM worth-considering as a solu-
tion to the puzzle of material constitution.  
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